Gabriel Radureau
8ec8fde67e
The accounting data + issued documents are legally retained 10 years and warrant a
backup dedicated to Dolibarr. An audit found the generic Longhorn external backup
NEVER covered the erp volume (its Longhorn volume sits in the orphaned `default`
recurring-job group; the only job has groups=[] → serves nothing; lastBackupAt=never).
So /var/www/documents (invoice PDFs, supplier pieces, contracts, ECM) had zero
offsite copy — only in-cluster replicas.
ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh (orchestrator) + ops/backup/backup-job.sh (in-container
logic, env-driven, single source of truth):
- pg_dump -Fc of the DB + tar of the documents PVC (RWX, read-only mount) ->
s3://arcodange-backup/erp/<env>/{db,docs}/<ts>, then tiered prune (daily 30d /
monthly 12m / yearly 10y).
- prod is READ-only (dump+tar read; writes go only to the backup bucket); the DB is
read with the env's own dynamic creds; the GCS HMAC secret is copied transiently
(base64, deleted on exit) and never printed; the whole script ships base64.
- fixes the aws-cli v2.23+ default-checksum incompatibility with GCS/S3-compat
(SignatureDoesNotMatch) via AWS_*_CHECKSUM_*=when_required.
Proven live: sandbox end-to-end (dump+tar+upload+prune, verified in GCS, cleaned up)
and retention logic unit-tested (1100 daily -> 46 kept). The FIRST real prod backup
was taken (erp/prod/db 1.2 MB + erp/prod/docs 12.5 MB) — closing the gap now.
Automation (recurring CronJob in the chart + a dedicated erp Vault policy for its
own S3 creds) is the documented next step; the orchestrator works today on demand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
77 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
77 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# Dolibarr dedicated backup
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A backup strategy **dedicated to Dolibarr**, because the accounting data and the
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issued documents are critical and legally retained **10 years** — they warrant more
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than the generic platform backup.
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## Why this exists (the gap it closes)
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On 2026-06-30 an audit of the Longhorn external backup found that **the erp documents
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volume had never been backed up offsite** (`lastBackupAt = never`): its Longhorn
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volume is enrolled only in the `default` recurring-job group, but the single backup
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job (`thrice-a-month-backup`) has `groups=[]`, so it serves *no* group — the erp
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volume (and erp-sandbox) fell through the crack. Only in-cluster Longhorn replicas
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protected `/var/www/documents` (issued invoice PDFs, supplier pieces, contracts, ECM)
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— which does not survive a cluster loss / corruption / power-cut.
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This tool backs up **both halves** of Dolibarr state to the existing object store
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(`s3://arcodange-backup`, GCS via the S3-compatible API), under `erp/<env>/`:
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| half | how | key |
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| Postgres DB | `pg_dump -Fc` (restorable) | `erp/<env>/db/<ts>.dump` |
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| documents PVC | `tar -czf` of `/var/www/documents` (RWX, mounted read-only) | `erp/<env>/docs/<ts>.tar.gz` |
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then prunes to a **tiered retention**: daily for 30 days, monthly for 12 months,
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yearly for ~10 years.
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## Safety (mirrors `ops/sandbox/sandbox-lifecycle.sh`)
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- **prod is read-only**: `pg_dump` and `tar` only read; the only writes go to the
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backup bucket, never to prod. The DB is read with the env's *own* dynamic creds
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(`vso-db-credentials`); prod and sandbox never cross.
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- **S3 creds are never exposed**: the GCS HMAC secret is copied into a *transient*
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secret in the app namespace (values stay base64), deleted on exit. The whole
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in-container script is shipped base64 — no secret is ever printed.
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## Usage
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```sh
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# one-shot backup + prune (run from anywhere; needs kubectl on the lab cluster)
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ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh backup --env prod
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ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh backup --env sandbox
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# what's in the store
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ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh list --env prod
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```
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`backup-job.sh` is the in-container logic (env-driven: `BUCKET PREFIX DB PGHOST` +
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the mounted DB/S3 creds) — the single source of truth, also intended for the
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scheduled CronJob (see "Automation" below).
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**Status:** the first real prod backup was taken 2026-06-30
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(`erp/prod/db/…` 1.2 MB, `erp/prod/docs/…` 12.5 MB). Proven end-to-end live on the
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sandbox (dump + tar + GCS upload + retention prune).
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## Restore (manual, for now)
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```sh
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# DB: aws s3 cp s3://arcodange-backup/erp/<env>/db/<ts>.dump - | pg_restore -h <host> -U <user> -d <db> --clean
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# docs: aws s3 cp s3://arcodange-backup/erp/<env>/docs/<ts>.tar.gz - | tar -C /var/www/documents -xzf -
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```
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The sandbox iso-prod refresh (`ops/sandbox/sandbox-lifecycle.sh`) is the natural
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restore-drill bench. A `restore` subcommand is wired next.
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## Automation (next step — gated on creds)
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The recurring form is a k8s **CronJob** (ArgoCD-managed, in the chart) running the
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same `backup-job.sh` daily. It needs its **own** S3 creds rather than borrowing the
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Longhorn secret cross-namespace: a `VaultStaticSecret` in the erp namespace reading
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the GCS backup creds, which requires the `erp` Vault role to be granted read on that
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path (a `tools` change). Until that lands, run the orchestrator above on demand /
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from a host cron — it works today by borrowing the Longhorn creds transiently.
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> The generic Longhorn gap (the orphaned `default` group) should be fixed too, as a
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> platform concern — but this dedicated, offsite, 10-year-retention backup is the
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> one that matches Dolibarr's legal criticality.
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