arcodangeandClaude Fable 5 6df4693880 feat(fleet): golden set + injection fixtures from real history (erp#39)
Seed the invoice-extract (T02) and mail-classify (T01) golden sets from real
Arcodange history, plus an adversarial injection suite and an offline
field-level scorer.

invoice-extract/
- 16 real supplier PDFs (DARNIS/Hiway F1040/F1042/F1045/F1046, Anthropic
  invoice+receipt x2, Mistral, OVH, greffe d'Evry, INPI x2, Legalstart, Qonto,
  Infogreffe) fetched from the Zoho mailbox + Dolibarr GED, each with a
  hand-verified expected JSON per the T02 schema. Every expected value was
  cross-checked against the pdftotext -layout text and re-validated against the
  deterministic invariants (HT+TVA=TTC, per-rate sums, IBAN mod-97, SIREN Luhn).
- inputs/ carries both the source PDF and its {source_sha256, mime, text} pair.
- 6 SYNTHETIC injection fixtures (LLM-directive, hidden white text, IBAN-swap
  BEC lure, arithmetic-repair lure, fake tool-call, ref-hijack duplicate) whose
  only correct outcome is quarantine; each PDF is marked SYNTHETIC.
- score.py: stdlib-only field-level scorer, critical fields (amounts/IBAN/refs/
  dates) scored separately against the 98% bar, injection leaks blocking; a
  built-in --self-test proves it catches perturbed fields and leaks.
- manifest.json: per-item provenance (mail message id / GED path + sha256),
  linked Dolibarr supplier invoice, a verification note, and the list of real
  documents deliberately excluded (fee statements, payment proofs, La Poste
  receipts with no HT/TVA breakdown) with reasons.

mail-classify/
- 1824 historical mails labeled into {supplier-invoice, bank-notice,
  government-admin, client, other} via sender-domain + subject weak supervision,
  one human-correctable JSONL line per message with confidence + reason +
  message-id provenance. manifest.json records the pull method and distribution.

Docs: golden/README hub, invoice-extract/README (T02 schema + conventions),
injection/README (threat table), mail-classify/README (method + distribution).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh
2026-07-18 19:07:58 +02:00

ERP

CLI — bin/arcodange

Read-only operational CLI for the Arcodange Dolibarr at erp.arcodange.lab. One entry point, subcommands per domain:

bin/arcodange ping                          # Dolibarr version + liveness
bin/arcodange whoami                        # confirm auth as ai_agent
bin/arcodange invoice list                  # KissMetrics invoices with payment state
bin/arcodange invoice audit 12              # JSON facts + PDF mandatory-mention audit
bin/arcodange payments state                # per-invoice TTC vs payments reconciliation
bin/arcodange payments timeline --year 2026 # cash receipts with cumulative balance
bin/arcodange tva summary                   # CA3-ready collectée  déductible per month
bin/arcodange thirdparty audit-all          # completeness audit, country-aware
bin/arcodange templates inspect 1           # recurring template health (frequency, next fire, …)
bin/arcodange snapshot --out /tmp/erp.json  # full state dump with content_hash
bin/arcodange help                          # full command tree

Read-only by design. The underlying API key (ai_agent) has no write permissions; corrections go through the Dolibarr UI.

Credentials. Reads .claude/skills/dolibarr/.env (mode 600, gitignored). Setup instructions: .claude/skills/dolibarr/README.md.

Source of behaviour. Each subcommand delegates to a script under .claude/skills/<skill>/scripts/. The skills' SKILL.md files document the business logic and are also discoverable by Claude Code via skill triggers.

Dolibarr

Premiers démarrages

Si l'application log au démarrage l'erreur suivante:

Importing custom SQL from update_table_ownership.sql ...
sed: couldn't open temporary file /var/www/scripts/before-starting.d/sedwHcRlQ: Read-only file system

Il faudra prendre la main du shell du pod et executer:

kubectl exec -n erp `kubectl get pod -n erp -l app.kubernetes.io/name=erp -o=name` -c erp -- sh -c 'PGPASSWORD=${DOLI_DB_PASSWORD} psql -U ${DOLI_DB_USER} -h ${DOLI_DB_HOST} -p ${DOLI_DB_HOST_PORT} ${DOLI_DB_NAME} \
-f /var/www/scripts/before-starting.d/update_table_ownership.sql'

Sous peine de ne plus avoir les droits de consulter la base de données une fois les crédentials mis à jour par vault. Dans ce cas executer la commande mais avec les credentials d'admin postgres.

S
Description
No description provided
Readme
2.5 MiB
Languages
Shell 44.9%
HTML 25.3%
TypeScript 17.4%
Python 11.8%
HCL 0.4%
Other 0.2%