arcodangeandClaude Opus 5
2e699e1fc6
Completes the role model on the sandbox side, and closes the third failure of the 2026-07/08 sessions: a refresh wiped hand-granted rights and nothing recorded them, so the sandbox silently lost capabilities nobody had written down. - Provisioned `ai_agent_sandbox_read` (36 rights) and `ai_agent_sandbox_sandbox_write` (44 rights) from test/scopes.ts. Verified functionally on the live sandbox: the reader reads and gets 403 on invoice creation; the writer creates a draft and gets 403 on DELETE. - checkpoint-provision.sh now re-creates both scoped agents after every refresh, so their rights come from code rather than from someone's memory. Failure to provision a scope warns instead of aborting the whole checkpoint. - checkpoint-relink-env.sh points the write skill at the scoped writer key, falling back to the legacy single-user key so an older checkout still works. The write skill now operates as ai_agent_sandbox_sandbox_write (id 6). Smoke-tested end to end after the credential swap: the promote pipeline rehearses on the sandbox under the scoped writer, and `apply` still refuses without a recorded human gate. The redundant `ai_agent_prod_prod_write` login is documented as deliberate: renaming a provisioned production credential means creating a second privileged user and repointing the promote flow — churn for cosmetics. Left behind in the sandbox: draft invoice id=19, a scope probe. It cannot be deleted (no scope grants DELETE, which is the point) and the next refresh reclaims it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh
41 lines
2.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
41 lines
2.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# (Re)write the dolibarr-sandbox-write skill .env from the provisioned key file,
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# then verify it authenticates. Run this after 'provision' (or any time the key
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# changed). The key is instance-encrypted per Dolibarr instance, so a refresh
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# invalidates it — re-provision first if this fails to authenticate.
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set -euo pipefail
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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ROOT="${ARCO_ROOT:-$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)}"
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SB_URL="${DOLIBARR_SANDBOX_URL:-https://erp-sandbox.arcodange.lab}"
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# Prefer the SCOPED writer (test/scopes.ts, `sandbox-write`); fall back to the
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# legacy single-user key so an older checkout keeps working. The scoped user is
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# what a refresh re-provisions, which is why it wins.
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KEY="${ROOT}/test/.ai_agent_sandbox_sandbox_write.key"
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[[ -s "${KEY}" ]] || KEY="${ROOT}/test/.ai_agent_sandbox.key"
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ENV="${ROOT}/.claude/skills/dolibarr-sandbox-write/.env"
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DOLW="${ROOT}/.claude/skills/dolibarr-sandbox-write/scripts/dol-write.sh"
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[[ -s "${KEY}" ]] || { echo "checkpoint-relink-env: no key at ${KEY}" >&2
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echo " run 'arcodange sandbox checkpoint provision' first." >&2; exit 1; }
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umask 077
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{ echo "DOLIBARR_SANDBOX_URL=${SB_URL}"
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printf 'DOLIBARR_SANDBOX_API_KEY=%s\n' "$(tr -d '\r\n' < "${KEY}")"; } > "${ENV}"
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chmod 600 "${ENV}"
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echo "✓ wrote ${ENV} (mode 600)"
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printf 'verify: '
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"${DOLW}" GET /users/info | python3 -c "import json,sys
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d = json.load(sys.stdin)
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if isinstance(d, dict) and d.get('login'):
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print('OK — armed as %s (id %s)' % (d['login'], d.get('id'))); sys.exit(0)
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err = d.get('error', {}) if isinstance(d, dict) else {}
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code = str(err.get('code', ''))
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if code == '401':
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print('FAILED — 401 key rejected (stale/instance-encrypted) → re-run checkpoint provision')
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elif code == '403':
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print('FAILED — 403 key authenticates but right 251 (user lire) is missing → re-provision or grant 251 (WRITE_IDS, test/provisionSandbox.ts)')
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else:
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print('FAILED — %s' % (err.get('message', '?') if isinstance(d, dict) else str(d)))
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sys.exit(1)"
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