arcodangeandClaude Opus 5
2e699e1fc6
Completes the role model on the sandbox side, and closes the third failure of the 2026-07/08 sessions: a refresh wiped hand-granted rights and nothing recorded them, so the sandbox silently lost capabilities nobody had written down. - Provisioned `ai_agent_sandbox_read` (36 rights) and `ai_agent_sandbox_sandbox_write` (44 rights) from test/scopes.ts. Verified functionally on the live sandbox: the reader reads and gets 403 on invoice creation; the writer creates a draft and gets 403 on DELETE. - checkpoint-provision.sh now re-creates both scoped agents after every refresh, so their rights come from code rather than from someone's memory. Failure to provision a scope warns instead of aborting the whole checkpoint. - checkpoint-relink-env.sh points the write skill at the scoped writer key, falling back to the legacy single-user key so an older checkout still works. The write skill now operates as ai_agent_sandbox_sandbox_write (id 6). Smoke-tested end to end after the credential swap: the promote pipeline rehearses on the sandbox under the scoped writer, and `apply` still refuses without a recorded human gate. The redundant `ai_agent_prod_prod_write` login is documented as deliberate: renaming a provisioned production credential means creating a second privileged user and repointing the promote flow — churn for cosmetics. Left behind in the sandbox: draft invoice id=19, a scope probe. It cannot be deleted (no scope grants DELETE, which is the point) and the next refresh reclaims it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh
ERP
CLI — bin/arcodange
Read-only operational CLI for the Arcodange Dolibarr at erp.arcodange.lab. One entry point, subcommands per domain:
bin/arcodange ping # Dolibarr version + liveness
bin/arcodange whoami # confirm auth as ai_agent
bin/arcodange invoice list # KissMetrics invoices with payment state
bin/arcodange invoice audit 12 # JSON facts + PDF mandatory-mention audit
bin/arcodange payments state # per-invoice TTC vs payments reconciliation
bin/arcodange payments timeline --year 2026 # cash receipts with cumulative balance
bin/arcodange tva summary # CA3-ready collectée − déductible per month
bin/arcodange thirdparty audit-all # completeness audit, country-aware
bin/arcodange templates inspect 1 # recurring template health (frequency, next fire, …)
bin/arcodange snapshot --out /tmp/erp.json # full state dump with content_hash
bin/arcodange help # full command tree
Read-only by design. The underlying API key (ai_agent) has no write permissions; corrections go through the Dolibarr UI.
Credentials. Reads .claude/skills/dolibarr/.env (mode 600, gitignored). Setup instructions: .claude/skills/dolibarr/README.md.
Source of behaviour. Each subcommand delegates to a script under .claude/skills/<skill>/scripts/. The skills' SKILL.md files document the business logic and are also discoverable by Claude Code via skill triggers.
Dolibarr
Premiers démarrages
Si l'application log au démarrage l'erreur suivante:
Importing custom SQL from update_table_ownership.sql ...
sed: couldn't open temporary file /var/www/scripts/before-starting.d/sedwHcRlQ: Read-only file system
Il faudra prendre la main du shell du pod et executer:
kubectl exec -n erp `kubectl get pod -n erp -l app.kubernetes.io/name=erp -o=name` -c erp -- sh -c 'PGPASSWORD=${DOLI_DB_PASSWORD} psql -U ${DOLI_DB_USER} -h ${DOLI_DB_HOST} -p ${DOLI_DB_HOST_PORT} ${DOLI_DB_NAME} \
-f /var/www/scripts/before-starting.d/update_table_ownership.sql'
Sous peine de ne plus avoir les droits de consulter la base de données une fois les crédentials mis à jour par vault. Dans ce cas executer la commande mais avec les credentials d'admin postgres.