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arcodangeandClaude Opus 4.7 a8b80f17e4 feat(backup): restore subcommand (db + documents), proven on the sandbox

dolibarr-backup.sh restore --db|--docs <ts> --env <e> --yes — the recovery half of
the dedicated backup. DESTRUCTIVE (gated by --yes + explicit --env): scales the app
to 0, then
- --db: DROP OWNED BY <owner_role> CASCADE + pg_restore --no-owner --role (same
  mechanics as sandbox-lifecycle.sh), from s3://.../erp/<env>/db/<ts>.dump;
- --docs: clears /var/www/documents and untars s3://.../erp/<env>/docs/<ts>.tar.gz;
then scales the app back to 1. OWNER_ROLE per env (erp_role / erp_sandbox_role).
The key is the bare <ts> filename from `list`; --db/--docs selects the subpath.

Proven on the sandbox: backup → mutate MAIN_INFO_SOCIETE_NOM to a sentinel →
restore --db → the value reverted to the backup's ('Arcodange'). (First run caught
a path bug — the fetch missed the db/ subdir — now fixed.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>

2026-06-30 18:05:19 +02:00

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Dolibarr dedicated backup

A backup strategy dedicated to Dolibarr, because the accounting data and the issued documents are critical and legally retained 10 years — they warrant more than the generic platform backup.

Why this exists (the gap it closes)

On 2026-06-30 an audit of the Longhorn external backup found that the erp documents volume had never been backed up offsite (lastBackupAt = never): its Longhorn volume is enrolled only in the default recurring-job group, but the single backup job (thrice-a-month-backup) has groups=[], so it serves no group — the erp volume (and erp-sandbox) fell through the crack. Only in-cluster Longhorn replicas protected /var/www/documents (issued invoice PDFs, supplier pieces, contracts, ECM) — which does not survive a cluster loss / corruption / power-cut.

This tool backs up both halves of Dolibarr state to the existing object store (s3://arcodange-backup, GCS via the S3-compatible API), under erp/<env>/:

half	how	key
Postgres DB	`pg_dump -Fc` (restorable)	`erp/<env>/db/<ts>.dump`
documents PVC	`tar -czf` of `/var/www/documents` (RWX, mounted read-only)	`erp/<env>/docs/<ts>.tar.gz`

then prunes to a tiered retention: daily for 30 days, monthly for 12 months, yearly for ~10 years.

Skip-if-unchanged: each half carries a content fingerprint at erp/<env>/.fp-{db,docs} and is dumped+uploaded only if it differs from the last run — so a quiet ERP day re-uploads nothing. The fingerprint is over durable business content only: the DB side is count + max(tms) over every tms table except volatile ones (llx_const, llx_user, sessions/cron), and the documents side excludes */temp/* (Dolibarr's constantly-regenerated stats cache) — from both the fingerprint and the tar.

Safety (mirrors `ops/sandbox/sandbox-lifecycle.sh`)

prod is read-only: pg_dump and tar only read; the only writes go to the backup bucket, never to prod. The DB is read with the env's own dynamic creds (vso-db-credentials); prod and sandbox never cross.
S3 creds are never exposed: the GCS HMAC secret is copied into a transient secret in the app namespace (values stay base64), deleted on exit. The whole in-container script is shipped base64 — no secret is ever printed.

Usage

# one-shot backup + prune (run from anywhere; needs kubectl on the lab cluster)
ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh backup --env prod
ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh backup --env sandbox

# what's in the store
ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh list --env prod

chart/files/backup-job.sh is the in-container logic (env-driven: BUCKET PREFIX DB PGHOST + the mounted DB/S3 creds) — the single source of truth shared by this orchestrator and the scheduled CronJob (see "Automation" below).

Status: the first real prod backup was taken 2026-06-30 (erp/prod/db/… 1.2 MB, erp/prod/docs/… 12.5 MB). Proven end-to-end live on the sandbox (dump + tar + GCS upload + retention prune).

Restore

ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh list    --env <e>                       # find the <ts> key
ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh restore --db   <ts>.dump    --env <e> --yes
ops/backup/dolibarr-backup.sh restore --docs <ts>.tar.gz  --env <e> --yes

DESTRUCTIVE (requires --yes + an explicit --env): scales the app to 0, then

--db: DROP OWNED BY <owner_role> CASCADE + pg_restore --no-owner --role (same reset mechanics as ops/sandbox/sandbox-lifecycle.sh), then scales back;
--docs: clears /var/www/documents and untars the archive, then scales back.

The key is the bare <ts> filename from list; --db/--docs selects the db/ or docs/ subpath. Proven on the sandbox: a mutated MAIN_INFO_SOCIETE_NOM was reverted to the backup's value by restore --db.

Automation — the CronJob (gated on creds)

The recurring form ships in the chart (chart/templates/backup-cronjob.yaml, backup.enabled=false by default): a daily CronJob (ConfigMap-mounted backup-job.sh) with its own S3 creds via a VaultStaticSecret — no cross-namespace borrowing of the Longhorn secret. To activate:

store the GCS HMAC creds (AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY / AWS_ENDPOINTS, same shape as longhorn-gcs-backup-credentials) at kvv2/<backup.vaultS3Path> (default erp/backup);
grant the erp auth Vault role read on that path (a tools change) if its policy doesn't already cover it;
set backup.enabled: true (+ tune schedule).

Until then, run the orchestrator above on demand / from a host cron — it works today by borrowing the Longhorn creds transiently.

The generic Longhorn gap (the orphaned default group) should be fixed too, as a platform concern — but this dedicated, offsite, 10-year-retention backup is the one that matches Dolibarr's legal criticality.

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