score.py: field-level scorer, critical fields at the 98 % bar, injection suite blocking, --self-test built in.
Per-item provenance (source id + sha256) in manifest.json; independently spot-checked by the orchestrator (scorer self-test PASS; expected-vs-pdftotext exact on 2 sampled docs) and corroborated by erp#43's independent re-fetch (4/4 sha256 match).
Push previously gated on the operator (real financial documents) — released by the operator's explicit go this session.
Closes #39.
Seeds `fleet/golden/` from real Arcodange history (74 files, 1.7 MB — full counts, provenance method and deviations in the [#39 evidence comment](https://gitea.arcodange.lab/arcodange-org/erp/issues/39#issuecomment-2950)):
- `invoice-extract/`: **16 real supplier documents** (inputs = source PDFs + pdftotext layer, expected = hand-verified T02 JSON), 7 real non-invoices excluded with reasons in the manifest.
- `invoice-extract/injection/`: **6 synthetic adversarial fixtures** (LLM-addressed directives, hidden white text, IBAN-swap, arithmetic-repair lure, fake tool-call, ref hijack) — expected outcome = quarantine, one leak = blocking.
- `mail-classify/`: **1824 labeled messages** (human-correctable JSONL).
- `score.py`: field-level scorer, critical fields at the 98 % bar, injection suite blocking, `--self-test` built in.
Per-item provenance (source id + sha256) in `manifest.json`; independently spot-checked by the orchestrator (scorer self-test PASS; expected-vs-pdftotext exact on 2 sampled docs) and corroborated by erp#43's independent re-fetch (4/4 sha256 match).
Push previously gated on the operator (real financial documents) — released by the operator's explicit go this session.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh
Seed the invoice-extract (T02) and mail-classify (T01) golden sets from real
Arcodange history, plus an adversarial injection suite and an offline
field-level scorer.
invoice-extract/
- 16 real supplier PDFs (DARNIS/Hiway F1040/F1042/F1045/F1046, Anthropic
invoice+receipt x2, Mistral, OVH, greffe d'Evry, INPI x2, Legalstart, Qonto,
Infogreffe) fetched from the Zoho mailbox + Dolibarr GED, each with a
hand-verified expected JSON per the T02 schema. Every expected value was
cross-checked against the pdftotext -layout text and re-validated against the
deterministic invariants (HT+TVA=TTC, per-rate sums, IBAN mod-97, SIREN Luhn).
- inputs/ carries both the source PDF and its {source_sha256, mime, text} pair.
- 6 SYNTHETIC injection fixtures (LLM-directive, hidden white text, IBAN-swap
BEC lure, arithmetic-repair lure, fake tool-call, ref-hijack duplicate) whose
only correct outcome is quarantine; each PDF is marked SYNTHETIC.
- score.py: stdlib-only field-level scorer, critical fields (amounts/IBAN/refs/
dates) scored separately against the 98% bar, injection leaks blocking; a
built-in --self-test proves it catches perturbed fields and leaks.
- manifest.json: per-item provenance (mail message id / GED path + sha256),
linked Dolibarr supplier invoice, a verification note, and the list of real
documents deliberately excluded (fee statements, payment proofs, La Poste
receipts with no HT/TVA breakdown) with reasons.
mail-classify/
- 1824 historical mails labeled into {supplier-invoice, bank-notice,
government-admin, client, other} via sender-domain + subject weak supervision,
one human-correctable JSONL line per message with confidence + reason +
message-id provenance. manifest.json records the pull method and distribution.
Docs: golden/README hub, invoice-extract/README (T02 schema + conventions),
injection/README (threat table), mail-classify/README (method + distribution).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.
Closes #39.
Seeds
fleet/golden/from real Arcodange history (74 files, 1.7 MB — full counts, provenance method and deviations in the #39 evidence comment):invoice-extract/: 16 real supplier documents (inputs = source PDFs + pdftotext layer, expected = hand-verified T02 JSON), 7 real non-invoices excluded with reasons in the manifest.invoice-extract/injection/: 6 synthetic adversarial fixtures (LLM-addressed directives, hidden white text, IBAN-swap, arithmetic-repair lure, fake tool-call, ref hijack) — expected outcome = quarantine, one leak = blocking.mail-classify/: 1824 labeled messages (human-correctable JSONL).score.py: field-level scorer, critical fields at the 98 % bar, injection suite blocking,--self-testbuilt in.Per-item provenance (source id + sha256) in
manifest.json; independently spot-checked by the orchestrator (scorer self-test PASS; expected-vs-pdftotext exact on 2 sampled docs) and corroborated by erp#43's independent re-fetch (4/4 sha256 match).Push previously gated on the operator (real financial documents) — released by the operator's explicit go this session.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh
Seed the invoice-extract (T02) and mail-classify (T01) golden sets from real Arcodange history, plus an adversarial injection suite and an offline field-level scorer. invoice-extract/ - 16 real supplier PDFs (DARNIS/Hiway F1040/F1042/F1045/F1046, Anthropic invoice+receipt x2, Mistral, OVH, greffe d'Evry, INPI x2, Legalstart, Qonto, Infogreffe) fetched from the Zoho mailbox + Dolibarr GED, each with a hand-verified expected JSON per the T02 schema. Every expected value was cross-checked against the pdftotext -layout text and re-validated against the deterministic invariants (HT+TVA=TTC, per-rate sums, IBAN mod-97, SIREN Luhn). - inputs/ carries both the source PDF and its {source_sha256, mime, text} pair. - 6 SYNTHETIC injection fixtures (LLM-directive, hidden white text, IBAN-swap BEC lure, arithmetic-repair lure, fake tool-call, ref-hijack duplicate) whose only correct outcome is quarantine; each PDF is marked SYNTHETIC. - score.py: stdlib-only field-level scorer, critical fields (amounts/IBAN/refs/ dates) scored separately against the 98% bar, injection leaks blocking; a built-in --self-test proves it catches perturbed fields and leaks. - manifest.json: per-item provenance (mail message id / GED path + sha256), linked Dolibarr supplier invoice, a verification note, and the list of real documents deliberately excluded (fee statements, payment proofs, La Poste receipts with no HT/TVA breakdown) with reasons. mail-classify/ - 1824 historical mails labeled into {supplier-invoice, bank-notice, government-admin, client, other} via sender-domain + subject weak supervision, one human-correctable JSONL line per message with confidence + reason + message-id provenance. manifest.json records the pull method and distribution. Docs: golden/README hub, invoice-extract/README (T02 schema + conventions), injection/README (threat table), mail-classify/README (method + distribution). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh