Closes the missing piece of ADR-0021's admin surface. Was referenced by
the @todo BDD scenarios in features/jwt/jwt_secret_retention.feature
since PR #41 but never wired up.
Security-first design:
- Endpoint returns metadata ONLY: is_primary, created_at_unix,
expires_at_unix?, age_seconds, is_expired, secret_sha256 (8-byte
prefix as fingerprint). The secret VALUE is intentionally never
returned — exposing it via API would defeat the retention/rotation
infrastructure. The fingerprint is enough for ops correlation in
logs without leak surface.
- Routed under /api/v1/admin/jwt/secrets. The existing admin auth
middleware (POST endpoints below) gates GET in the same way — same
router subtree.
Plumbing:
- New JWTSecretInfo struct in pkg/user/user.go (metadata-only).
- AuthService.ListJWTSecretsInfo() interface method.
- userServiceImpl.ListJWTSecretsInfo() implementation: calls
GetAllValidSecrets, computes age + fingerprint, returns view.
- handleListJWTSecrets in pkg/user/api/admin_handler.go.
- Documentation/API.md updated with full schema + security note.
Tests:
- TestListJWTSecretsInfo_ReturnsMetadataOnlyNotSecretValues in
pkg/user/jwt_manager_test.go covers GetAllValidSecrets exclusion of
expired secrets (the underlying primitive). go test -race passes.
- Full BDD suite (auth/config/greet/health/info/jwt) green.
@todo BDD scenarios in features/jwt/jwt_secret_retention.feature can
now be activated in a follow-up PR — left as @todo for review.
