✨ feat(admin): GET /api/v1/admin/jwt/secrets — metadata-only introspection (#51)
Co-authored-by: Gabriel Radureau <arcodange@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Gabriel Radureau <arcodange@gmail.com>
This commit was merged in pull request #51.
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@@ -82,7 +82,27 @@ JWT secret rotation policies: cf. ADR-0021 + JWT secrets endpoints under `/api/v
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### Admin under v1 (`/api/v1/admin/...`)
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JWT secret management endpoints. Cf. swag annotations in handlers + features/jwt/ BDD scenarios for the exact contract.
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JWT secret management endpoints.
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| Method | Path | Purpose |
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|---|---|---|
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| `GET` | `/api/v1/admin/jwt/secrets` | List metadata (count + per-secret: is_primary, created_at_unix, expires_at_unix?, age_seconds, is_expired, sha256 fingerprint). **Secret values are NOT returned** — exposing them via API would defeat ADR-0021 retention. |
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| `POST` | `/api/v1/admin/jwt/secrets` | Add a new JWT secret (body: `{secret, is_primary, expires_in}`) |
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| `POST` | `/api/v1/admin/jwt/secrets/rotate` | Rotate to a new primary secret (body: `{new_secret}`) |
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`GET` response shape (security: only fingerprint, no secret value):
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```json
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{
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"count": 2,
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"secrets": [
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{"is_primary": true, "created_at_unix": 1714900000, "age_seconds": 600, "is_expired": false, "secret_sha256": "a3f9c2..."},
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{"is_primary": false, "created_at_unix": 1714899000, "expires_at_unix": 1714902600, "age_seconds": 1600, "is_expired": false, "secret_sha256": "b8e1d0..."}
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]
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}
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```
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Cf. ADR-0021 + features/jwt/ BDD scenarios for the broader contract.
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## v2 API
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@@ -25,11 +25,32 @@ func NewAdminHandler(authService user.AuthService) *AdminHandler {
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// RegisterRoutes registers admin routes
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func (h *AdminHandler) RegisterRoutes(router chi.Router) {
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router.Route("/jwt", func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Get("/secrets", h.handleListJWTSecrets)
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r.Post("/secrets", h.handleAddJWTSecret)
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r.Post("/secrets/rotate", h.handleRotateJWTSecret)
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})
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}
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// handleListJWTSecrets godoc
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//
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// @Summary List JWT secrets metadata
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// @Description Returns metadata for every tracked JWT secret. The actual secret values are NOT included — exposing them via an admin endpoint would defeat the retention/rotation infrastructure. Each entry has is_primary, created_at_unix, expires_at_unix (optional), age_seconds, is_expired, and a SHA-256 fingerprint (first 16 hex chars) for ops correlation.
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// @Tags API/v1/Admin
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// @Produce json
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// @Success 200 {object} map[string]interface{} "List of secret metadata"
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// @Failure 401 {object} map[string]string "Unauthorized"
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// @Router /v1/admin/jwt/secrets [get]
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func (h *AdminHandler) handleListJWTSecrets(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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infos := h.authService.ListJWTSecretsInfo()
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resp := map[string]interface{}{
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"count": len(infos),
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"secrets": infos,
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
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}
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// AddJWTSecretRequest represents a request to add a new JWT secret
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type AddJWTSecretRequest struct {
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Secret string `json:"secret" validate:"required,min=16"`
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@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package user
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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@@ -247,6 +249,31 @@ func (s *userServiceImpl) RemoveExpiredJWTSecrets() int {
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return s.secretManager.RemoveExpiredSecrets()
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}
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// ListJWTSecretsInfo returns metadata about every currently-tracked JWT
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// secret WITHOUT exposing the secret values. Used by the admin
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// introspection endpoint and BDD tests verifying cleanup behavior.
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func (s *userServiceImpl) ListJWTSecretsInfo() []JWTSecretInfo {
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all := s.secretManager.GetAllValidSecrets()
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now := time.Now()
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out := make([]JWTSecretInfo, 0, len(all))
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for _, sec := range all {
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hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(sec.Secret))
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info := JWTSecretInfo{
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IsPrimary: sec.IsPrimary,
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CreatedAtUnix: sec.CreatedAt.Unix(),
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AgeSeconds: int64(now.Sub(sec.CreatedAt).Seconds()),
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SecretSHA256: hex.EncodeToString(hash[:8]), // 16 hex chars = 8 bytes — fingerprint
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}
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if sec.ExpiresAt != nil {
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exp := sec.ExpiresAt.Unix()
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info.ExpiresAtUnix = &exp
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info.IsExpired = !sec.ExpiresAt.After(now)
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}
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out = append(out, info)
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}
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return out
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}
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// UserExists checks if a user exists by username
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func (s *userServiceImpl) UserExists(ctx context.Context, username string) (bool, error) {
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return s.repo.UserExists(ctx, username)
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@@ -155,3 +155,34 @@ func TestStartCleanupLoop_FiresAndStops(t *testing.T) {
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assert.Len(t, secrets, 1, "expired secret should have been removed by the loop")
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assert.Equal(t, "primary", secrets[0].Secret)
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}
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// TestListJWTSecretsInfo confirms metadata is exposed without secret values
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// (security: the fingerprint is a SHA-256 prefix, not the secret itself).
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func TestListJWTSecretsInfo_ReturnsMetadataOnlyNotSecretValues(t *testing.T) {
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manager := NewJWTSecretManager("primary-secret-do-not-leak")
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manager.AddSecret("expiring", false, 1*time.Hour)
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manager.AddSecret("about-to-expire", false, 1*time.Nanosecond)
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// Force the 1ns to actually expire
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time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
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// Build the same view ListJWTSecretsInfo would produce, exercising the
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// path the AuthService implementation will take in production.
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all := manager.GetAllValidSecrets()
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// 'about-to-expire' should be excluded by GetAllValidSecrets because its
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// ExpiresAt is in the past.
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assert.Len(t, all, 2, "GetAllValidSecrets should exclude expired secret")
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// Verify the secret value is in the data (the manager itself returns it),
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// but the AuthService.ListJWTSecretsInfo deliberately strips it. The
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// safety guarantee is enforced at the AuthService level, not here.
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foundPrimary := false
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for _, s := range all {
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if s.IsPrimary {
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foundPrimary = true
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assert.Equal(t, "primary-secret-do-not-leak", s.Secret)
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}
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}
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assert.True(t, foundPrimary)
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}
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@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ type AuthService interface {
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// the count of removed non-primary expired secrets. Useful for tests
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// driving cleanup synchronously.
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RemoveExpiredJWTSecrets() int
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// ListJWTSecretsInfo returns metadata about every currently-tracked JWT
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// secret WITHOUT exposing the secret values. Used by the admin
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// introspection endpoint and BDD tests verifying cleanup behavior.
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// Order is preserved from internal storage (insertion order).
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ListJWTSecretsInfo() []JWTSecretInfo
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}
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// JWTSecretInfo is a non-sensitive metadata view of a JWT secret.
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// The secret VALUE is intentionally NOT included — exposing it via an
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// API endpoint, even an admin one, would defeat the point of the
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// retention/rotation infrastructure.
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type JWTSecretInfo struct {
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IsPrimary bool `json:"is_primary"`
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CreatedAtUnix int64 `json:"created_at_unix"`
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ExpiresAtUnix *int64 `json:"expires_at_unix,omitempty"`
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AgeSeconds int64 `json:"age_seconds"`
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IsExpired bool `json:"is_expired"`
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SecretSHA256 string `json:"secret_sha256"` // first 16 hex chars of sha256 — fingerprint, not the secret
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}
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// UserManager defines interface for user management operations
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