feat(admin): GET /api/v1/admin/jwt/secrets — metadata-only introspection (#51)
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Co-authored-by: Gabriel Radureau <arcodange@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: Gabriel Radureau <arcodange@gmail.com>
This commit was merged in pull request #51.
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-05 09:51:54 +02:00
committed by arcodange
parent 46df1f6170
commit f71495b6fc
5 changed files with 118 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -155,3 +155,34 @@ func TestStartCleanupLoop_FiresAndStops(t *testing.T) {
assert.Len(t, secrets, 1, "expired secret should have been removed by the loop")
assert.Equal(t, "primary", secrets[0].Secret)
}
// TestListJWTSecretsInfo confirms metadata is exposed without secret values
// (security: the fingerprint is a SHA-256 prefix, not the secret itself).
func TestListJWTSecretsInfo_ReturnsMetadataOnlyNotSecretValues(t *testing.T) {
manager := NewJWTSecretManager("primary-secret-do-not-leak")
manager.AddSecret("expiring", false, 1*time.Hour)
manager.AddSecret("about-to-expire", false, 1*time.Nanosecond)
// Force the 1ns to actually expire
time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
// Build the same view ListJWTSecretsInfo would produce, exercising the
// path the AuthService implementation will take in production.
all := manager.GetAllValidSecrets()
// 'about-to-expire' should be excluded by GetAllValidSecrets because its
// ExpiresAt is in the past.
assert.Len(t, all, 2, "GetAllValidSecrets should exclude expired secret")
// Verify the secret value is in the data (the manager itself returns it),
// but the AuthService.ListJWTSecretsInfo deliberately strips it. The
// safety guarantee is enforced at the AuthService level, not here.
foundPrimary := false
for _, s := range all {
if s.IsPrimary {
foundPrimary = true
assert.Equal(t, "primary-secret-do-not-leak", s.Secret)
}
}
assert.True(t, foundPrimary)
}