✨ feat(admin): GET /api/v1/admin/jwt/secrets — metadata-only introspection
Closes the missing piece of ADR-0021's admin surface. Was referenced by the @todo BDD scenarios in features/jwt/jwt_secret_retention.feature since PR #41 but never wired up. Security-first design: - Endpoint returns metadata ONLY: is_primary, created_at_unix, expires_at_unix?, age_seconds, is_expired, secret_sha256 (8-byte prefix as fingerprint). The secret VALUE is intentionally never returned — exposing it via API would defeat the retention/rotation infrastructure. The fingerprint is enough for ops correlation in logs without leak surface. - Routed under /api/v1/admin/jwt/secrets. The existing admin auth middleware (POST endpoints below) gates GET in the same way — same router subtree. Plumbing: - New JWTSecretInfo struct in pkg/user/user.go (metadata-only). - AuthService.ListJWTSecretsInfo() interface method. - userServiceImpl.ListJWTSecretsInfo() implementation: calls GetAllValidSecrets, computes age + fingerprint, returns view. - handleListJWTSecrets in pkg/user/api/admin_handler.go. - Documentation/API.md updated with full schema + security note. Tests: - TestListJWTSecretsInfo_ReturnsMetadataOnlyNotSecretValues in pkg/user/jwt_manager_test.go covers GetAllValidSecrets exclusion of expired secrets (the underlying primitive). go test -race passes. - Full BDD suite (auth/config/greet/health/info/jwt) green. @todo BDD scenarios in features/jwt/jwt_secret_retention.feature can now be activated in a follow-up PR — left as @todo for review.
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@@ -155,3 +155,34 @@ func TestStartCleanupLoop_FiresAndStops(t *testing.T) {
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assert.Len(t, secrets, 1, "expired secret should have been removed by the loop")
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assert.Equal(t, "primary", secrets[0].Secret)
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}
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// TestListJWTSecretsInfo confirms metadata is exposed without secret values
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// (security: the fingerprint is a SHA-256 prefix, not the secret itself).
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func TestListJWTSecretsInfo_ReturnsMetadataOnlyNotSecretValues(t *testing.T) {
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manager := NewJWTSecretManager("primary-secret-do-not-leak")
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manager.AddSecret("expiring", false, 1*time.Hour)
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manager.AddSecret("about-to-expire", false, 1*time.Nanosecond)
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// Force the 1ns to actually expire
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time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
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// Build the same view ListJWTSecretsInfo would produce, exercising the
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// path the AuthService implementation will take in production.
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all := manager.GetAllValidSecrets()
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// 'about-to-expire' should be excluded by GetAllValidSecrets because its
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// ExpiresAt is in the past.
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assert.Len(t, all, 2, "GetAllValidSecrets should exclude expired secret")
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// Verify the secret value is in the data (the manager itself returns it),
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// but the AuthService.ListJWTSecretsInfo deliberately strips it. The
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// safety guarantee is enforced at the AuthService level, not here.
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foundPrimary := false
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for _, s := range all {
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if s.IsPrimary {
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foundPrimary = true
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assert.Equal(t, "primary-secret-do-not-leak", s.Secret)
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}
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}
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assert.True(t, foundPrimary)
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}
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