Migration applied to production, in the only order that does not break the promote flow: 1. Created `ai_agent_prod_prod_write` (id=5) with the narrow `prod-write` scope — invoices, payments, and document submission (needed by builddoc to regenerate a modified invoice's PDF). Verified functionally: reads pass, DELETE on an invoice returns 403. 2. Repointed the promote pipeline at that user's key. It no longer borrows the read skills' credential; if the key is absent it dies with the provisioning command rather than silently falling back. 3. Revoked 12 write/delete rights from `ai_agent` (id=3), the credential every read skill holds: create/modify on customer AND supplier invoices, thirdparties, contacts, thirdparty payment details, proposals, exports, accounting links — and delete on proposals, events, and GED documents. Verified after: invoices, thirdparties, contacts, products, proposals, supplier invoices and bank accounts all still read; creating an invoice returns `403 Forbidden: Insuffisant rights`. The documented posture and the real one finally agree. scopes.ts corrected against the live instance: 262 is NOT "créer/modifier les produits" as the first catalogue guessed but the `voir_tous` ACL extension — a READ right the skills depend on (without it, list endpoints return empty arrays instead of 403). Revoking it would have silently blinded every read skill. This is why the audit reads labels off /user/perms.php rather than trusting ids in code. The READ_ONLY baseline is now the audited read surface (35 rights), not a guess. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh
test — Dolibarr UI automation (Deno + Playwright)
A small Deno + Playwright POC that drives the Dolibarr admin UI in the fr-FR
locale. Playwright fills the same forms a human admin would, so the automation
works even where the REST API can't (e.g. generating an API key, which is
encrypted with the instance's own DOLI_INSTANCE_UNIQUE_ID).
Layout
main.ts— original entrypoint (first install, company/display/module setup).provisionSandbox.ts— entrypoint that provisions theerp-sandboxinstance for the AI agent (enable REST API, create a write-scoped user, generate its API key).scripts/login.ts— admin login / logout / whoami helpers.scripts/forms.ts—fillForm,toggleOnOff, CKEditor/ACE helpers.scripts/admin/moduleSetup.ts—configureModule,enableApiModule.scripts/admin/userSetup.ts—createUser,assignRights,generateApiKey.
Configure
Copy .env.example to .env and fill it in. .env, *.key, and
.ai_agent_sandbox.key are gitignored — never commit secrets.
cp .env.example .env
Lock the installer (after a fresh install via main.ts)
Dolibarr keeps its web installer reachable until an install.lock file exists.
After a fresh install (the main.ts flow), create it in the target pod — for the
sandbox:
kubectl -n erp-sandbox exec \
"$(kubectl get pod -n erp-sandbox -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=erp-sandbox -o name)" -- \
/bin/sh -c 'touch /var/www/documents/install.lock && chown www-data:www-data /var/www/documents/install.lock'
The path is the Dolibarr data root (/var/www/documents, a PVC) — that's where
Dolibarr checks, and being on the PVC the lock persists across pod restarts. For
prod, swap to -n erp -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=erp. A sandbox seeded from
prod still needs this: the seed (see ../ops/sandbox/) copies the DB +
documents/mycompany, not install.lock.
Provision the sandbox
Provisions erp-sandbox.arcodange.lab: enables the REST API module, creates the
write-scoped ai_agent_sandbox user, grants it its write rights, and has
Dolibarr generate the user's API key. The key is written to
test/.ai_agent_sandbox.key (gitignored) — it is never printed.
cd test
deno run --allow-all provisionSandbox.ts
Populate .env from the erp-sandbox namespace secrets first. secretkv
carries the app env (including DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD); vso-db-credentials
carries the database password:
# Admin password (key DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD inside the secretkv secret)
kubectl get secret secretkv -n erp-sandbox \
-o jsonpath='{.data.DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD}' | base64 -d
# Database password (key `password` inside vso-db-credentials)
kubectl get secret vso-db-credentials -n erp-sandbox \
-o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
Set in .env:
DOLIBARR_ADDRESS=https://erp-sandbox.arcodange.lab
DOLI_ADMIN_LOGIN=admin
DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD="<from secretkv above>"
DOLI_DB_PASSWORD="<from vso-db-credentials above>"
# Optional — otherwise a random password is generated and only the API key emitted:
# AI_AGENT_SANDBOX_PASSWORD="<choose one>"
After it runs
The generated API key lands in test/.ai_agent_sandbox.key. Next step (not
automated by this POC): load it into the dolibarr skill's sandbox config /
Vault at kvv2/erp-sandbox/ai_agent.
Important
The sandbox Dolibarr is not installed/provisioned yet (empty DB, fresh install wizard). Until the install wizard has been completed against the sandbox,
provisionSandbox.tswill not have a UI to drive, and the selectors inmoduleSetup.ts/userSetup.tsare best-effort (Dolibarr 22 conventions, not verified live). Confirm them on the first real run.
Write rights granted
The ai_agent_sandbox user is created non-admin and granted (the authoritative
list is WRITE_IDS in provisionSandbox.ts):
| Module | rights ids |
|---|---|
| facture | lire=11, creer=12 |
| societe | lire=121, creer=122, client voir=262 |
| societe contact | lire=281, creer=282 |
| fournisseur | lire=1181, facture lire=1231, facture creer=1232 |
| produit | lire=31, creer=32 |
| banque | lire=111 |
| user | lire=251 — requis par le probe armé GET /users/info (checkpoint status/relink-env) |