Files
erp/test
arcodangeandClaude Opus 5 1cba032512 fix(security): production read agent is now actually read-only
Migration applied to production, in the only order that does not break the
promote flow:

1. Created `ai_agent_prod_prod_write` (id=5) with the narrow `prod-write` scope —
   invoices, payments, and document submission (needed by builddoc to regenerate
   a modified invoice's PDF). Verified functionally: reads pass, DELETE on an
   invoice returns 403.
2. Repointed the promote pipeline at that user's key. It no longer borrows the
   read skills' credential; if the key is absent it dies with the provisioning
   command rather than silently falling back.
3. Revoked 12 write/delete rights from `ai_agent` (id=3), the credential every
   read skill holds: create/modify on customer AND supplier invoices,
   thirdparties, contacts, thirdparty payment details, proposals, exports,
   accounting links — and delete on proposals, events, and GED documents.

Verified after: invoices, thirdparties, contacts, products, proposals, supplier
invoices and bank accounts all still read; creating an invoice returns
`403 Forbidden: Insuffisant rights`. The documented posture and the real one
finally agree.

scopes.ts corrected against the live instance: 262 is NOT "créer/modifier les
produits" as the first catalogue guessed but the `voir_tous` ACL extension — a
READ right the skills depend on (without it, list endpoints return empty arrays
instead of 403). Revoking it would have silently blinded every read skill. This
is why the audit reads labels off /user/perms.php rather than trusting ids in
code. The READ_ONLY baseline is now the audited read surface (35 rights), not a
guess.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh
2026-08-09 19:33:00 +02:00
..
2025-08-08 17:57:56 +02:00
2025-08-08 17:57:56 +02:00

test — Dolibarr UI automation (Deno + Playwright)

A small Deno + Playwright POC that drives the Dolibarr admin UI in the fr-FR locale. Playwright fills the same forms a human admin would, so the automation works even where the REST API can't (e.g. generating an API key, which is encrypted with the instance's own DOLI_INSTANCE_UNIQUE_ID).

Layout

  • main.ts — original entrypoint (first install, company/display/module setup).
  • provisionSandbox.ts — entrypoint that provisions the erp-sandbox instance for the AI agent (enable REST API, create a write-scoped user, generate its API key).
  • scripts/login.ts — admin login / logout / whoami helpers.
  • scripts/forms.tsfillForm, toggleOnOff, CKEditor/ACE helpers.
  • scripts/admin/moduleSetup.tsconfigureModule, enableApiModule.
  • scripts/admin/userSetup.tscreateUser, assignRights, generateApiKey.

Configure

Copy .env.example to .env and fill it in. .env, *.key, and .ai_agent_sandbox.key are gitignored — never commit secrets.

cp .env.example .env

Lock the installer (after a fresh install via main.ts)

Dolibarr keeps its web installer reachable until an install.lock file exists. After a fresh install (the main.ts flow), create it in the target pod — for the sandbox:

kubectl -n erp-sandbox exec \
  "$(kubectl get pod -n erp-sandbox -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=erp-sandbox -o name)" -- \
  /bin/sh -c 'touch /var/www/documents/install.lock && chown www-data:www-data /var/www/documents/install.lock'

The path is the Dolibarr data root (/var/www/documents, a PVC) — that's where Dolibarr checks, and being on the PVC the lock persists across pod restarts. For prod, swap to -n erp -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=erp. A sandbox seeded from prod still needs this: the seed (see ../ops/sandbox/) copies the DB + documents/mycompany, not install.lock.

Provision the sandbox

Provisions erp-sandbox.arcodange.lab: enables the REST API module, creates the write-scoped ai_agent_sandbox user, grants it its write rights, and has Dolibarr generate the user's API key. The key is written to test/.ai_agent_sandbox.key (gitignored) — it is never printed.

cd test
deno run --allow-all provisionSandbox.ts

Populate .env from the erp-sandbox namespace secrets first. secretkv carries the app env (including DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD); vso-db-credentials carries the database password:

# Admin password (key DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD inside the secretkv secret)
kubectl get secret secretkv -n erp-sandbox \
  -o jsonpath='{.data.DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD}' | base64 -d

# Database password (key `password` inside vso-db-credentials)
kubectl get secret vso-db-credentials -n erp-sandbox \
  -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d

Set in .env:

DOLIBARR_ADDRESS=https://erp-sandbox.arcodange.lab
DOLI_ADMIN_LOGIN=admin
DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD="<from secretkv above>"
DOLI_DB_PASSWORD="<from vso-db-credentials above>"
# Optional — otherwise a random password is generated and only the API key emitted:
# AI_AGENT_SANDBOX_PASSWORD="<choose one>"

After it runs

The generated API key lands in test/.ai_agent_sandbox.key. Next step (not automated by this POC): load it into the dolibarr skill's sandbox config / Vault at kvv2/erp-sandbox/ai_agent.

Important

The sandbox Dolibarr is not installed/provisioned yet (empty DB, fresh install wizard). Until the install wizard has been completed against the sandbox, provisionSandbox.ts will not have a UI to drive, and the selectors in moduleSetup.ts / userSetup.ts are best-effort (Dolibarr 22 conventions, not verified live). Confirm them on the first real run.

Write rights granted

The ai_agent_sandbox user is created non-admin and granted (the authoritative list is WRITE_IDS in provisionSandbox.ts):

Module rights ids
facture lire=11, creer=12
societe lire=121, creer=122, client voir=262
societe contact lire=281, creer=282
fournisseur lire=1181, facture lire=1231, facture creer=1232
produit lire=31, creer=32
banque lire=111
user lire=251 — requis par le probe armé GET /users/info (checkpoint status/relink-env)