arcodangeandClaude Opus 5
11c8c65d45
provisionSandbox.ts granted `[12, 122, 262, 32, 111, 251]`: opaque numeric ids, one fixed scope, one agent per environment. Three failures in the 2026-07/08 sessions came straight from that: 1. Production `ai_agent` — documented as READ-ONLY in AGENTS.md, ADR-0003 and every SKILL.md — actually holds 46 rights against 9 declared, including create/modify on customer AND supplier invoices, thirdparties, contacts, thirdparty payment details, proposals, plus THREE delete rights (proposals, events, and submit/delete documents in the GED). 2. Writing a payment, then a product, to production each required granting a right by hand and revoking it after. A privilege granted ad hoc under time pressure is worse than one nobody holds. 3. A sandbox refresh wiped the agent's proposal rights, because they had been granted manually and lived nowhere in code. - scopes.ts declares three scopes with their purpose and allowed environments: `read` (both envs), `sandbox-write` (sandbox only), `prod-write` (production only, narrow: invoices + payments, what the gated promote apply actually does). resolveScope() refuses a scope on an environment it does not belong to. No scope grants DELETE — the ledger is append-only, deletion stays human. - provisionAiUser.ts creates or aligns one user per (environment × scope), emits its API key to a gitignored 600 file, and has an --audit mode that diffs what a user HOLDS against what its scope DECLARES. Production writes require the guard.ts opt-in. - The audit reads permission labels LIVE off /user/perms.php rather than trusting a catalogue in code: ids are stable per Dolibarr version, not across them, and an audit that cannot name what it found is not actionable. findUserId is implemented locally rather than imported: the trunk's userSetup.ts has one, but it is uncommitted WIP and a provisioning script must not depend on someone's working tree. Tooling only — no production rights were changed. The migration (create the scoped users, repoint the promote pipeline, then strip the over-grants from `ai_agent`) rotates credentials used by every read skill and is the operator's call. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRShc4QhLLU73FLHx9vskh
test — Dolibarr UI automation (Deno + Playwright)
A small Deno + Playwright POC that drives the Dolibarr admin UI in the fr-FR
locale. Playwright fills the same forms a human admin would, so the automation
works even where the REST API can't (e.g. generating an API key, which is
encrypted with the instance's own DOLI_INSTANCE_UNIQUE_ID).
Layout
main.ts— original entrypoint (first install, company/display/module setup).provisionSandbox.ts— entrypoint that provisions theerp-sandboxinstance for the AI agent (enable REST API, create a write-scoped user, generate its API key).scripts/login.ts— admin login / logout / whoami helpers.scripts/forms.ts—fillForm,toggleOnOff, CKEditor/ACE helpers.scripts/admin/moduleSetup.ts—configureModule,enableApiModule.scripts/admin/userSetup.ts—createUser,assignRights,generateApiKey.
Configure
Copy .env.example to .env and fill it in. .env, *.key, and
.ai_agent_sandbox.key are gitignored — never commit secrets.
cp .env.example .env
Lock the installer (after a fresh install via main.ts)
Dolibarr keeps its web installer reachable until an install.lock file exists.
After a fresh install (the main.ts flow), create it in the target pod — for the
sandbox:
kubectl -n erp-sandbox exec \
"$(kubectl get pod -n erp-sandbox -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=erp-sandbox -o name)" -- \
/bin/sh -c 'touch /var/www/documents/install.lock && chown www-data:www-data /var/www/documents/install.lock'
The path is the Dolibarr data root (/var/www/documents, a PVC) — that's where
Dolibarr checks, and being on the PVC the lock persists across pod restarts. For
prod, swap to -n erp -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=erp. A sandbox seeded from
prod still needs this: the seed (see ../ops/sandbox/) copies the DB +
documents/mycompany, not install.lock.
Provision the sandbox
Provisions erp-sandbox.arcodange.lab: enables the REST API module, creates the
write-scoped ai_agent_sandbox user, grants it its write rights, and has
Dolibarr generate the user's API key. The key is written to
test/.ai_agent_sandbox.key (gitignored) — it is never printed.
cd test
deno run --allow-all provisionSandbox.ts
Populate .env from the erp-sandbox namespace secrets first. secretkv
carries the app env (including DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD); vso-db-credentials
carries the database password:
# Admin password (key DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD inside the secretkv secret)
kubectl get secret secretkv -n erp-sandbox \
-o jsonpath='{.data.DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD}' | base64 -d
# Database password (key `password` inside vso-db-credentials)
kubectl get secret vso-db-credentials -n erp-sandbox \
-o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
Set in .env:
DOLIBARR_ADDRESS=https://erp-sandbox.arcodange.lab
DOLI_ADMIN_LOGIN=admin
DOLI_ADMIN_PASSWORD="<from secretkv above>"
DOLI_DB_PASSWORD="<from vso-db-credentials above>"
# Optional — otherwise a random password is generated and only the API key emitted:
# AI_AGENT_SANDBOX_PASSWORD="<choose one>"
After it runs
The generated API key lands in test/.ai_agent_sandbox.key. Next step (not
automated by this POC): load it into the dolibarr skill's sandbox config /
Vault at kvv2/erp-sandbox/ai_agent.
Important
The sandbox Dolibarr is not installed/provisioned yet (empty DB, fresh install wizard). Until the install wizard has been completed against the sandbox,
provisionSandbox.tswill not have a UI to drive, and the selectors inmoduleSetup.ts/userSetup.tsare best-effort (Dolibarr 22 conventions, not verified live). Confirm them on the first real run.
Write rights granted
The ai_agent_sandbox user is created non-admin and granted (the authoritative
list is WRITE_IDS in provisionSandbox.ts):
| Module | rights ids |
|---|---|
| facture | lire=11, creer=12 |
| societe | lire=121, creer=122, client voir=262 |
| societe contact | lire=281, creer=282 |
| fournisseur | lire=1181, facture lire=1231, facture creer=1232 |
| produit | lire=31, creer=32 |
| banque | lire=111 |
| user | lire=251 — requis par le probe armé GET /users/info (checkpoint status/relink-env) |